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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this study is to explain why collegiate athletes should be paid and the 
financial impact of paying them.  The study looks at how the NCAA’s student-athlete 
model has exploited collegiate athletes and denied them from receiving a share of the 
revenues they generate each year. It includes the reasons for paying players, and the 
troubles athletes go through because of the way the NCAA is orchestrated. The goal is to 
determine the financial effect of paying athletes across the NCAA, as well as by divisions 
and conferences. Additionally, the financial statements of the NCAA and some of its 
Division I schools were analyzed to determine discrepancies and weaknesses in the 
reporting process that misinform the public on the state of most athletic departments. The 
study focuses on Division I athletic departments, as well as football, men’s basketball, 
and women’s basketball players.  Through financial databases, interviews, and court 
cases, the study aims to identify the problems with the current NCAA system while 
addressing the financial impact of paying collegiate athletes.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 The question of whether or not to pay collegiate athletes has been debated for 
many years. NCAA officials and university administrators alike have vouched that the 
current collegiate model is sufficiently acceptable. To change that model by adding 
financial compensation for athletes would go against the rudimentary philosophy of the 
NCAA. The defendants of the NCAA consistently recite amateurism as one of the core 
ideas behind why athletes do not deserve to be paid. In actuality though, the list of 
reasons why athletes should not be paid is resoundingly brief. The reality is that a pivotal 
question remains unanswered by NCAA officials. Why should athletes be paid? The list 
of answers to this question far outweighs the list of answers to the contrary. The NCAA 
states that only 1.6% of football players, 1.2% of men’s basketball players, and 0.9% of 
women’s basketball players will play professionally. The idea that college athletes will 
eventually reap the monetary benefits of their athletic abilities by turning pro is false. The 
odds of making it as a professional athlete are miniscule, and for most athletes the 
monetary benefits of playing sports can only be obtained while in college. This issue has 
become relevant due to the amount of money the NCAA and Division I universities have 
increasingly generated through collegiate athletics. The industry has become a 
powerhouse that rivals the professional leagues and shows no signs of slowing down 
anytime soon. The financial impact of paying players is undoubtedly a difficult dilemma 
to explore, but nonetheless is a quandary worthy of consideration.  
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CHAPTER 2: THE ORIGIN OF THE NCAA 
 
 
Amateurism 
 
To understand the financial problems facing college athletes, one must first 
comprehend the fallacy of the NCAA. The National Collegiate Athletic Association was 
founded in 1906 due to the emergence of the dangerous sport known today as football. In 
1905 eighteen college and amateur players died while playing the sport and the NCAA 
looked to lead the charge of regulating football in order to ensure the survival of the 
sport. Even in its origin the association was derived mainly for protection of players’ 
rights and safety, not to promote amateurism. When taking a look at the structure of the 
NCAA today, that very ideology has been reversed.  
 The 1916 bylaws defined an amateur as “one who participates in competitive 
physical sports only for the pleasure, and the physical, mental, moral, and social benefits 
directly derived therefrom.” The love of the game is undoubtedly what drives all athletes, 
but high school players are also severely motivated by the thought of receiving an athletic 
scholarship from their favorite schools. If NBA superstars were not making millions of 
dollars, they would undoubtedly still play basketball; but the problem is, the only 
distinction between an amateur and a professional is compensation. NCAA President 
Mark Emmert has persistently stated that there is no possibility of the association ever 
condoning paying players. Simply put, it violates the “core values” of collegiate athletics. 
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The following is an except from a 2011 interview between former NCAA President 
Myles Brand, bolded, and Sports Illustrated columnist Michael Rosenberg: 
"They can't be paid." 
"Why?" 
"Because they're amateurs." 
"What makes them amateurs?" 
"Well, they can't be paid." 
"Why not?" 
"Because they're amateurs." 
Who decided they are amateurs? 
"We did." 
"Why?" 
The reason why student-athletes are still deemed amateurs is even unexplainable by the 
same people that run the NCAA. A group of college friends playing pickup basketball on 
a Saturday is correctly defined as an amateur sporting event. However, college athletes 
that play in front of thousands of ticket purchasing fans is not amateurism; instead, this is 
called taking advantage of the system. A longtime critic of the NCAA, Taylor Branch, 
explained this best in an article published by The Atlantic:  
I don't doubt that people care about athletes, but if you care about somebody, deal 
first with their rights. Imagine this: suppose the university was to say we're going 
to have amateurism for all the students on our campus, so we can be consistent. 
And that means that you can't get a job at the campus bookstore if you're an 
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undergraduate, you can't be paid as a teaching assistant if you're a graduate 
student. You're an amateur (Branch).  
When analyzed from the perspective of a regular college student, it would be 
confounding for an English major at the University of Mississippi to be expelled from 
school for receiving money from a book he or she published. For college athletes, though, 
following this amateur code ultimately determines eligibility.  
The Olympics were originated as a form of “amateur” athletics and it was not 
until the 1970s that professionals were allowed to compete in the games. Olympic 
athletes before this time would not meet the NCAA’s definition of an amateur. Early 
Greek Olympic athletes did not train their entire lives for only a laurel wreath, but instead 
for the prize, property, and women they were given after the games. Even back in 600 
B.C., “a winning athlete from Athens was given 500 drachma, an enormous sum - enough 
that he could theoretically live off of it for the rest of his life” (Cronin). If the Olympics 
have been able to outlast the controversy of paying athletes, then why can’t the NCAA do 
the same? 
 
Walter Byers 
 In 1951 the NCAA took control of intercollegiate athletics. Walter Byers, a 
journalist, was named executive director of the association. During this time the NCAA 
saw television contracts as a threat to college sports due to the contracts causing potential 
catastrophic decline in live-game attendance. Byers used this risk, as an opportunity to 
regulate the market and make the NCAA in charge of orchestrating television deals with 
providers in order to restrict which games would be broadcast. As times passed he was 
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able to negotiate a five percent cut of all television deals to be paid to the NCAA. The 
biggest contribution Walter Byers made to the NCAA was the invention of the term 
student-athlete. The term was crafted after Byers consulted with lawyers on how to 
defend the NCAA and its schools against the increasing number of workers’ 
compensation lawsuits that were being filed due to injuries and even deaths caused from 
playing collegiate football. Byers himself stated, “The colleges are scared to death at the 
prospect of having their athletes identified as employees and therefore subject to 
workman’s comp. I had our law firm do major research on this issue. Our law firm, they 
say, rely on the old amateur rule to say: look, these are students first and athletes second. 
These are ‘student athletes,’ and they are working at their professional training as a 
student and, therefore, are not subject to workman’s comp” (Schooled: The price of 
college sports). The term student-athlete is a conundrum within itself. The word student-
athlete means that college players are not merely students, nor are they just athletes who 
play in college. The fact that they are the best athletes high schools have to offer means 
they can be accepted at a university, without achieving the school’s academic standards 
enforced on other student applicants; and that because they are also deemed as high 
school students, they do not have to be compensated any further than a scholarship. This 
became the NCAA’s signature term, and although seemingly harmless at the time, it 
would be used as a defense in many lawsuits to come. 
 Kent Waldrep was a star running back for the 1974 Texas Christian University 
football team. In an October game against Alabama, Waldrep suffered a career-ending 
neck injury that paralyzed him from the neck down. TCU refused to pay anymore of his 
medical bills after nine months, forcing him to look for public donations to cover the 
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cost. He filed a lawsuit stating that TCU had violated his worker compensation rights. His 
lawyers arbitrated with the state insurance fund over how his time at the university 
constituted employment and that he should have access to workers’ compensation 
benefits due to his “job” with the football team. The court ruled that he was not an 
employee due to the fact that he did not have to pay taxes on his financial aid and, 
therefore, forfeited any workers’ compensation rights. Keep in mind that the NCAA is a 
tax-free not-for-profit entity. The school used the term student-athlete to vindicate how 
the university did not employ Waldrep even though his scholarship was for athletic 
purposes. The case foreshadowed how the NCAA and its schools as a legalistic defense 
and shield from other impending lawsuits could use the carefully constructed term. 
 
Students first, Athletes second 
 The NCAA, for many years, has lauded that its collegiate athletics participants are 
students first and athletes second. The belief is that they are awarded athletic scholarships 
in exchange for the chance at receiving a priceless education, and any achievements on 
the field are deemed residual. The NCAA reports the graduation rates of its student-
athletes using their Graduation Success Rate module. The GSR accounts for all first-time 
degree seeking students, as well as transfer students that obtain a degree within six years 
of starting college, while also accounting for student-athletes who transfer out to another 
school to obtain a degree or turn pro. The GSR currently sits at eighty four percent, which 
is nineteen percentage points higher than the federal graduation rate of all Division I 
students (NCAA). Although these statistics show that more athletes obtain degrees in 
comparison to regular students, the federal measure graduation rate of athletes, which 
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does not account for transfers out and athletes who turn pro, is only one percentage point 
higher than that of regular students (NCAA). The problem though is not graduation rates; 
it is that most Division I schools are more concerned with an athlete’s eligibility, rather 
than his or her education. Now this is not to say that schools don’t value education; but, 
for an athlete, it’s hard to say that education comes before athletics when the amount of 
time spent doing team activities significantly outweighs the time spent in the classroom.  
 Each year every NCAA athlete is required to sign a renewed contract with the 
NCAA stating they will oblige to all rules governing them. Their athletic scholarships are 
dependent upon this agreement. While they must follow the NCAA rules, their 
scholarships are also contingent upon other things and renewed on a year-by-year basis. 
An athlete’s education is reliant on this one-year scholarship. For many players, their 
athletic performance on the field carries far more weight than their performance in the 
classroom. Each year schools have the option to terminate or renew each athletic 
scholarship. The setback to this is that an athlete’s poor performance on the field can 
ultimately mean loss of scholarship. 
Winning is the ultimate goal of playing sports. In order to win you need players 
who are eligible to participate. The motto “C’s get degrees” rings truest with college 
athletes. Domonique Foxworth, a member of the 2002-2004 Maryland Terrapin football 
team, said it best, “I knew it was more valuable to my school that I get a C on an exam 
and an interception on Saturday, then it was that I get straight A’s and get no 
interceptions on Saturday. That doesn’t bring in boosters and that doesn’t bring in fans to 
fill the stadium.”  This problem stems from schools admitting academically unprepared 
athletes and then trying their best to keep these athletes eligible. In 2010 the University of 
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North Carolina found themselves caught up in an academic fraud scandal. For the past 18 
years an estimated 3100 students had enrolled in so called “paper classes” (Ganim and 
Sayers). This meant that many athletes had been enrolled in classes that required no 
attendance or meetings with a professor and the only grade was a paper. Many of these 
athletes then reached out to tutors to help them complete the assignment. The classes 
were listed as African American Independent Study courses and many of UNC’s 
academic advisors termed them “GPA boosters.” For example, an early-enrolled football 
player could have a 1.4 GPA in the spring and then take three paper classes over the 
summer, receiving A’s in all of them, which would in turn boost his GPA to 3.0 and keep 
him eligible for the upcoming football season. This is not just a UNC problem, but also a 
problem for top athletic schools around the country. Money is powerful and drives a 
multitude of decisions. Winning games brings in large amounts of revenue, and schools 
will jump through hoops to keep top athletes eligible rather than actually teaching 
athletes and providing them with real learning experiences. For athletic departments and 
teams, money and winning are given top priority over education. A college education in 
exchange for an athletic scholarship is priceless; but one of the biggest fallacies in 
collegiate athletics is the belief that a true and meaningful education is actually provided. 
The NCAA states that ninety eight percent of collegiate athletes will turn pro in 
something other than sports. With that being the case, athletes need a proper education to 
prepare them for their future professions. When the NCAA and its schools don’t keep 
their end of the offer, they are taking advantage of an athlete’s physical abilities and 
providing them with scholarships that in turn offer no educational benefit. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE NCAA IS BIG BUSINESS 
Salaries 
The NCAA’s annual revenue has increased yearly since 2000, making it one of 
the most stable organizations in the United States (Alesia). In 2014 alone the NCAA 
listed its total revenue at $989,029,512. College athletes receive none of this money, but 
for coaches and athletic directors, the monetary benefits are endless. There are currently 
128 NCAA Division I head football coaches. In 2014, the average salary for a Division I 
head football coach was $1.75 million and this same figure jumps up to $3.85 million 
when taking only into account the top twenty-five highest paid coaches (Baumbach). 
According to a study by USA Today, the average athletic director’s salary was $515,000 
in 2012. Many of the top grossing universities also have incentives in place where the 
school’s athletic director can make upwards of one million dollars. These figures are 
alarming because, according to a 2013 Chronicle of Higher Education survey, the 
average salary of a public university president was $478,896. The NCAA states that 
collegiate athletes are students first and athletes second, but the salary data show 
otherwise. How can this be the case when a Division I football coach makes on average 
over $500,000 more than the president at the same university? The highest paid state 
employee in 40 of the 50 states is not the governor or any other state official, but instead 
is the head football or basketball coach at the state’s university.  
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 Nick Saban, the head football coach of the Alabama Crimson Tide, made 
$7,160,187 last year (USA Today). July Bonner, the university’s president, made only 
$585,000 last year (Brown).  The salary gap has grown more and more each year and puts 
into question what universities value. This data suggests that the NCAA and its 
universities are sending mixed signals to Division I football players. Although players are 
told they are “students first, athletes second,” the salary gap does not follow that same 
logic.  
 
TV Contracts, Ticket Sales, Sponsorships, and Donations 
 The original source of NCAA revenue came from TV contracts. As stated 
previously, Walter Byers originally regulated what games could be broadcast on national 
television in order to keep fans in the stadium and not watching from their living rooms.  
With the growth in technology and fan base, the NCAA and its member schools have 
been able to generate hundreds of millions of dollars from selling broadcasting rights to 
games. The Power Five conferences include the ACC, SEC, Big XII, Pac-12, and Big 
Ten. Together, these conferences brought in over $1.1 billion this past year from network 
TV partners alone (Smith). The SEC currently has TV contracts with both CBS and 
ESPN. After the launch of the SEC Network, the conference will pull in $400 million per 
year from its combined deals, which comes out to about $28.5 million per school (Glass). 
The agreement was for 20 years. Another large contract was signed in 2012 by ESPN for 
the rights to broadcast the College Football Playoff starting in 2014. The contract was for 
$5.64 billion over 12 years, with ESPN paying the NCAA a projected $470 million 
annually (Bachman). This means that the conferences represented will receive even larger 
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amounts of money if their teams make it into the playoff. To say that the financial market 
of college athletics is healthy would be an understatement.  
 While TV contracts generate vast sums of money, they are second to ticket sales 
in the amount of revenue generated.  Louisiana State University, the home of Death 
Valley, generated $38.9 million in ticket sales in 2014 (Gaines). They ranked 8th on the 
list of total athletic revenue last year with $117.5 million. Roughly thirty three percent of 
the school’s athletic revenue came from the sell of tickets alone. LSU fans pay lots of 
money each year to watch the school’s athletes compete on the field. LSU versus 
Alabama ranked 3rd on the list of highest football ticket prices per game in 2014, with an 
average ticket price of $639 (Stankevitz). The seating capacity at Death Valley, the 
school’s football stadium, is 102,321. The fact is that the amount of money generated 
from this game is made possible due to the combined 170 players on the field. Without 
these players, the surge in not only revenue for tickets, but also the economic benefit for 
the city of Baton Rouge, would not be possible.  
In 2010 ESPN conducted a fan poll to determine the popularity of U.S. sports 
leagues. NCAA football finished second, trailing only the NFL, with more than 64 
million fans. Large apparel companies have taken notice to this trend and are looking to 
market their brand name all across college football.  When mentioning Oregon football, 
the first thing that comes to mind is not the players or the stadium the football team plays 
in, but the Nike uniforms worn on the field. All NCAA football teams wear uniforms, but 
none are more revered than the ones worn by the Oregon Ducks. So why do the Oregon 
Ducks wear such outlandish uniforms? First, they are a recruiting advantage used to help 
try to sign the nation’s top high school players. Second, Nike founder and Oregon alum 
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Phil Knight pays the school a lot of money to wear them. Oregon receives $600,000 a 
year in cash, $2.2 million in equipment, and $185,000 in discretionary apparel, mostly 
worn by coaches and the athletic department (Kish). For a company like Nike, this small 
investment is miniscule in comparison to the revenue generated from its NCAA licensed 
products sold to consumers. Marcus Mariota, this year’s Heisman Trophy winner, wears 
number 8 for the Oregon football team. Nike sold replicas of his NCAA Championship 
jersey for $160, removing his last name from above the number in accordance with 
NCAA licensing agreements. Mariota received a grand total of zero dollars from the sale 
of this merchandise. At the same time the NCAA and Nike reaped the financial benefits 
made possible by Mariota’s athletic abilities.  
 
Table 3-1: Apparel and Equipment Contracts 
 
 
According to data collected by the Portland Business Journal (Table 3-1), Nike is not the 
only apparel juggernaut paying universities to wear their products. Adidas paid an 
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average of $5.3 million per contract to Power Five conference schools (ACC, Big Ten, 
Big XII, Pac-12, SEC) for wearing their products. The Michigan athletic department led 
the nation and the list with an $8.2 million contract from Adidas.  
 Sonny Vaccaro is often cited as the catalyst that ignited the commercialism of 
collegiate sports in the 1980s. Vaccaro was a sports marketing executive who approached 
Phil Knight in 1979 about the idea of paying college basketball coaches in exchange for 
their team’s players wearing exclusively Nike shoes. What started out as five to fifteen 
thousand dollars a year eventually grew to over one hundred thousand dollars in 
compensation to top college coaches. This all changed in 1987 when Nike signed the first 
all-sports deal with the University of Miami. Vaccaro called Phil Knight after the deal 
and said, “This is it, we hit the motherload. Now we own the school.” Nike, in other 
words, was now the exclusively licensed brand sold at the bookstore. This meant that 
every jersey sold and all official Miami Hurricane sports apparel had the Nike logo on it. 
Vaccaro stumbled upon a gold mine in college athletics, and had set the standard for all 
apparel and licensing agreements to come. 
 Donations account for another large portion of most Division I schools athletic 
department’s revenue. The Ole Miss Athletic Foundation requires donations for priority 
seats in the football, basketball, and baseball stadiums. The foundation’s membership 
contributions totaled $31,213,404 in 2014 (Appendix A). The contributions are broken 
down into restricted and unrestricted revenues. Restricted revenues mean that the money 
was received with a restriction imposed by the donor that will be satisfied for a particular 
purpose or program or for use in a specified time period. Unrestricted contributions to the 
football team ranked 1st with roughly $11 million, while the basketball team finished 3rd 
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at roughly $850,000 (Appendix A). The foundation reported that its revenues exceed its 
expenses by $12.8 million (Appendix A). Now Ole Miss currently ranks 12th in the SEC 
ahead of only Mississippi State and Vanderbilt in total athletic department revenue (USA 
Today), which does not have to report its earnings since it is a private institution. Overall 
the athletic department, which encompasses the Ole Miss Athletic Foundation, reported 
just over $2 million in profit (USA Today). Despite being the second smallest school in 
the SEC, the university’s athletic department was still able to turn a profit, proving that 
size is not always the problem when trying to stay in the black.  
 
March Madness 
 The crown jewel of the NCAA is its annual postseason basketball tournament. 
Termed March Madness by the media and fans, the tournament showcases over 680 
men’s basketball players. It brought in a staggering $769.4 million of revenue in 2013, 
which accounted for 84% of the NCAA’s total revenue that year (Alesia). March 
Madness is the NCAA’s cash cow and it is safe to say, without it the association would 
not exist. The NCAA gets to keep roughly 40% of the tournament’s revenue, while the 
remaining 60% is disbursed to the schools and conferences with teams competing in the 
games. In 2013 the NCAA distributed a record $527.3 million to schools and 
conferences, in part, because of the large sum of money made from the tournament alone 
(Alesia). 
In 2010, CBS and Turner Broadcasting inked a deal with the NCAA for the rights 
to broadcast all of the tournaments 67 games. The record-breaking deal was for $10.8 
billion that lasts until 2024 (Sandomir and Thamel). CBS will pay an average of $771 
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million each year to the NCAA and in turn will have the rights to all coverage, as well as 
the ability to sell all commercial advertising during the games. The ability to sell TV 
advertising during the tournament is the reason CBS made the deal in first place. 
Sponsors spent more than $1.1 billion in 2014 buying airtime for television commercials 
(Gaines). This one three-week event in March and April is second only to only the NFL 
playoffs in terms of revenue generated from television commercial advertising.   
 The NCAA’s basketball fund is its largest pool of money donated to schools. The 
fund is the only one allocated based upon each school’s competitive sports success. The 
NCAA projected the total amount of money available for distribution in 2014 to be $220 
million. Now the NCAA wishes that this money be split up between the thirty-two 
conferences with teams in the tournament and not just by each school individually. While 
many of the larger conferences do indeed split up the earnings evenly between all schools 
no matter who made the tournament and who did not, some of the smaller conference’s 
teams can achieve a revenue boost with the ability to carry that individual program for 
years to come.  The NCAA uses a complicated formula to divide up the $220 million, but 
in simple terms the money is split up evenly into 132 units (Appendix B). Will Hobson 
wrote an article titled “Fund and Games” for The Washington Post in which he discussed 
just how much money conferences have riding on NCAA Tournament games:  
Just by making this year’s tournament, a school earns its conference a projected 
$1.67 million over the next six years, broken into annual payments from the 
NCAA that will start with $260,500 in 2016. A run all the way to the Final Four 
earns five units, or an estimated $8.33 million, which is the maximum for most 
teams. The NCAA stops awarding units after the national semifinals.  
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This means that in a worst-case scenario a conference will earn at least $1.67 million off 
of one of their teams making the tournament, and in a best-case scenario $8.33 million if 
the team were to make it all the way to the Final Four.  For the Power Five conferences 
the money generated from tournament appearances is relatively small in comparison to 
the rest of its athletic revenue. But for smaller conferences, the tournament generates on 
average 35% of that conferences total revenue (Hobson). These large payouts show not 
only the potential financial ability to compensate players in larger conferences, but also in 
smaller conferences as well. The key statistic though is that the amount of money paid by 
the fund to the players in the tournament is zero. Sport’s economist Dan Rascher 
expressed his discomfort with the March Madness Tournament while testifying against 
the NCAA in legal challenges to amateurism. He stated, “It’s un-American. It’s so 
atypical of anything else we have in this country, where we have this very successful 
industry, and the athletes generate a ton of value, and the money goes elsewhere.” The 
return on investment that the NCAA generates off the players during the tournament is 
immense. Shabazz Napier, the point guard for last year’s Champion UCONN, endured 
going to bed hungry at night during the season because he was unable to afford food. The 
sheer amount of money made off of these players during the March Madness Tournament 
should enable some sort of compensation to be paid to the players in order to ensure their 
physical well being.   
 
Financial Statements 
The financial stature of the NCAA has grown year after year with revenues during 
the 2015 fiscal year expected to top one billion dollars. The NCAA was founded as a 
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non-profit, tax-exempt organization in accordance with Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal 
Revenue Code.  This means that because the NCAA has no shareholders and is classified 
as a charitable organization it is not taxed on any of its yearly earnings. The same is true 
for its member schools. The NCAA had a total of $707.8 million in net assets for the 
2014 fiscal year (Appendix C). While the NCAA does distribute most of their revenues 
back into the pockets of Division I schools, they do retain some of that money. The 
NCAA’s Consolidate Statement of Activities shows an eighty million dollar surplus for 
2014. That number was sixty one million in 2013 and seventy two million in 2012. For a 
tax-exempt non-profit entity, those surpluses continue to pour into the NCAA’s net assets 
balance. So what are these assets currently being held for? The NCAA calls this their 
crisis fund. In the event of losing TV contracts or corporate sponsors, the NCAA would 
dip into these reserves in order to help the association stay afloat.  Mark Emmert, the 
president of the National Collegiate Athletic Association, has testified in court that the 
NCAA and its member schools do not have the financial means to account for the 
potential cost of compensating collegiate athletes. While at the same time, the NCAA has 
a “crisis fund” of over $700 million. It is a good idea for all organizations to have back 
up reserves in the event of a financial crisis, but it is ethically wrong for one of healthiest 
leagues in all of sports to deem all of their hundreds of millions off limits to players. 
The NCAA also has multimillions in investments. These investments are broken 
down into three different levels and are in accordance with ASC 820, Fair Value 
Measurements, which establishes a framework for measuring fair value. This framework 
provides fair value hierarchy that prioritizes the inputs to valuation techniques used to 
measure fair value. The NCAA currently does not have any Level 3 investments, which 
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are valued based upon unobservable inputs and the entities own analysis. Level 1 
investments are the most easily valued and are based on unadjusted quoted prices in 
active markets that are accessible at measurement date. Split up between different money 
market, mutual, and fixed income funds, the NCAA has a total of $328,793,014 to date in 
Level 1 investments (Appendix C). After adding in its Level 2 totals, based upon 
observable inputs other than quoted prices, the total leaps up to $681,314,256. This was a 
14% increase from 2013. The NCAA’s financial statements show that these investments 
are doing quite well. 
 
Table 3-2: NCAA Investment Income (in millions) 
 
Source: 2014 NCAA Financial Statements 
 
 
Realized gains occur once a financial asset is disbursed for a profit. Although the NCAA 
saw a slight dip in both net realized gains and interest income in 2014, its total 
investment income almost doubled from the previous year (Table 3-2). Unrealized gains 
saw the biggest increase, but since they are only “paper profits” no monetary benefit has 
been received. Although much of their investment income came from unrealized gains, 
the NCAA has over $250 million in alternative assets that are valued using Net Asset 
Value. Of these investments all but hedge funds and bank loans are able to redeemed 
daily. More proof that NCAA is in good health comes when analyzing its liquidity ratio. 
The association has a current ratio of 3.25. To put that number in perspective, technology 
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juggernaut Apple had only a ratio of 1.08. This means the NCAA has more than an 
adequate amount of assets available to pay its short-term liabilities. Since this number is 
so high, it also raises the question of what the NCAA is planning to do with all this 
money. As stated previously much of the association’s net assets are being held in 
operating and endowment reserves, but a key figure is the $88.7 million being held in 
their available for operations and distributions accounts (Appendix C). This number grew 
by 46% from 2013 and shows that the NCAA currently does not have to dip into this 
account in order to sustain its yearly distributions to schools. The notes to the 2014 
financial statements say that, “The NCAA Executive Committee has designated certain 
unrestricted net assets to fund future strategic and operational initiatives. While 
designated for specific purposes, these designations may be modified at the discretion of 
the NCAA Executive Committee.” This really means that the NCAA has more than $80 
million of excess spending money to use wherever they see fit. Adding this eighty million 
to another $80 million surplus helps nullify the idea that there is not enough money 
available to compensate collegiate athletes. 
 
Case Study: University of Texas 
 Since the dawn of the 21st Century the golden standard of collegiate athletics has 
been the University of Texas. No school in the past ten years has brought in more athletic 
revenue than the University of Texas.  The figures show that the school’s athletic 
department amassed more than $165 million in revenue during 2013 (Table 3-3).  
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Table 3-3: Texas Athletic Revenue since 2005 
 
 
Forbes has conducted their own method used to value top sports programs. The 
business magazine states, “our valuation methodology for college football teams looks at 
the value generated by college football's top teams for four key areas: their universities, 
athletic departments, conferences and local communities.” Texas ranked first on this list 
with an estimated value of $131 million. The school’s athletic department turned a profit 
of $18.8 million last year, and much of the university’s financial growth has been 
attributed to the rise of the Longhorn Network. This partnership with ESPN will be worth 
an estimated $300 million over the next 20 years. Perhaps the most interesting fact about 
the athletic department is that it receives zero subsidies from student fees, direct and 
indirect institutional support, and state money (USA Today).  Even with the cost of hiring 
a brand new football staff this season, the school was able to self sustain its athletic 
budget. 
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Texas is starting to realize the outlook of the NCAA, and the way it treats players 
is changing. The school is expected to start setting aside $6 million a year to pay athletes 
(Lindenberger).  This money will be distributed at about $10,000 per player for expenses 
not covered by a full scholarship. Five thousand dollars of this money will compensate 
players for the university’s use of his or her image. Texas can afford to do this, while 
some other schools can’t; but what really matters is that they are planning and accounting 
for potential payments to players. The financial leader of all college sports is helping set 
the pace and budgeting for a potential NCAA reform -- something many of its 
counterparts can learn from.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   22	  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: THE COST OF COLLEGE 
The truth of a “full-ride” 
 At some point in every competitive athlete’s life, he or she dreams about playing 
for his or her favorite school without it ever costing them a penny. In reality though, only 
two percent of all high school athletes are awarded collegiate athletic scholarships 
(NCAA). Among these scholarships only six sports are exclusively full- ride awards: 
men’s basketball and football, as well as women’s basketball, volleyball, tennis, and 
gymnastics. For other sports, their scholarship allotment is sliced up into portions and 
divvied between most of the athletes on the team. In 2008 the New York Times ran a 
study on the reality of sport’s scholarships. The average athletic scholarship amount was 
$10,409 (Pennington). Although it has been almost seven years, the numbers are still in 
that ballpark. The NCAA states athletic scholarships offer the opportunity for a free 
education, but many athletes’ scholarship money is less than half of the yearly tuition and 
room and board at a Division I school.  
 The median household income in the U.S. is $53,891 (CNN). The College Board 
recently released a 2014-2015 study on the average price of college, combining public 
and private universities, in the United States. The numbers showed the cost attending a 
four-year institution in state was $18,943 and $32,762 for out-of-state students. Many 
students’ and athletes’ families do not have the financial means to send their children to 
college. So scholarships and financial aid play a large role in bridging the gap. Using 
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parallel 2008 data, Mark Kantrowitz, a financial aid expert, stated that 16.9% of 
undergraduates in bachelor’s degree programs received an academic scholarship 
(Shellenbarger). This adds to the proof that the best way to receive financial help towards 
obtaining a degree is to excel in the classroom, instead of on the field.  
Stories of star athletes coming from impoverished homes and receiving an athletic 
scholarship make the news all the time. The term “full-ride” gets thrown around a lot 
when talking about these athletic scholarships, but statistics show that the term isn’t 
completely accurate.  Cost of attendance is calculated by the financial aid department of 
each university and consists of total cost of tuition and fees, room and board, books and 
supplies, transportation, and other miscellaneous expenses. Right now the average NCAA 
“full-ride” scholarship has a $3,500 gap in covering the full cost of attendance 
(Solomon).  This means that a student-athlete who comes from a poor family may not be 
able to afford basic life necessities while on full scholarship. For example, a football 
player who plays in a game on Saturday may not be able to afford a meal out with friends 
afterwards. This gap must change and the words “free education” should never be spoken 
when referring to athletic scholarships.  
 
Collegiate sports are a full time job 
A typical day for me at the University of Mississippi consists of waking up at nine 
in the morning, attending class for three hours, doing three hours of homework, and 
having the evening to do whatever I please with my time. I am attending school on an 
academic scholarship. Evan Engram, the starting tight end for the Ole Miss football team, 
has a schedule much different than mine. I spoke with Evan on the pressures and time 
	   24	  
constraints placed on him during football season. During a normal fall weekday Evan will 
wake up around 8am and attend class for three hours starting at 9am. Straight from class 
Evan reports to the weight room for an hour of strength and conditioning. His day is just 
now getting started. From his conditioning session, Evan heads straight into an hour and a 
half team meeting. Once the meeting wraps up, it’s straight to the practice field. Practice 
normally lasts two and a half hours, to about 7pm each night. After practice he attends a 
film session to prepare for the upcoming opponent on Saturday. Once this wraps up, he 
heads off to back-to-back tutoring sessions starting at 8pm. He arrives back to his condo a 
little before 10pm to finish the rest of his school and athletic homework, then goes to bed 
and repeats the same process again the following day. Evan estimates spending about 
seven hours each day on football activities alone, and easily more than forty hours a week 
during the season. For Evan, his football scholarship comes as payment for a fulltime job. 
He estimates spending an extra $300 a month on a basic necessity like food. While the 
athletic department does provide meals for athletes, Evan voiced how these meals are 
quick to run out. Without the financial help from his parents, he would be forced to go 
hungry at times, as well as not be able to fill up his car with gas in order to get to and 
from football activities. He stated that many players on the team do not have the luxury 
of a financially supportive family. He explained that many players on the team find it 
hard to understand how the NCAA can disallow them from making money off of their 
own name and image. He stated, “Some of the top recruits from my class, including 
myself, signed footballs after games this past year. I decided to look on eBay to find out 
if any of the balls were being sold.  What I found was a ball with Robert [Nkemdiche], 
Laremy [Tunsil], Laquon [Treadwell], and my signatures on it going for over $400. 
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Someone is out there making money directly off the autographs of me and my 
teammates.” For Evan, football is still the same game he loved to play as a kid. However, 
now that game has turned into a fulltime job where, thanks to his labor, large sums of 
money are being made. 
 At the 2011 NCAA convention in San Antonio, athletes were surveyed about the 
amount of time they spend each week on both sports and academics. The results 
concluded a long-standing perception that being an athlete requires the same amount of 
work as a fulltime job. Division I men’s basketball and football players spend an average 
of 39.2 and 43.3 hours per week playing games, practicing, and training during the 
season. Football players reported spending only 38 hours each week on academics during 
the season, while basketball players where close behind at 37.3 hours. Women’s 
basketball players reported spending 37.6 hours on athletics and 38.9 hours on academics 
each week during the season. This data is astounding considering that NCAA Bylaw 
17.1.5.1 states that student-athletes are not to exceed twenty hours per week participating 
in athletic activities. Not only do athletes exceed that amount, but many also spend more 
hours a week on team activities than on academics.  This survey does not factor in the 
countless hours athletes spend on athletics just to try and obtain a college scholarship. 
Once again, it’s not a “free education.” Athletes have to work just as hard, if not harder, 
than other students in the classroom to receive the academic benefits of their scholarship. 
 
Todd Gurley 
 The star of the Georgia Bulldog football team this year was undoubtedly Todd 
Gurley. He led the team in almost every offensive statistic up until week six of the 
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season. On October 9, 2014, this all changed for the Heisman Trophy frontrunner. Gurley 
was accused of signing five hundred items of memorabilia for an autograph dealer in 
exchange for $8 to $25 per item (ESPN). Video evidence showed Gurley signing 
autographs, but no money exchanging hands. The amount of money received from those 
autographs would have been as little as four thousand dollars, a mere five hundred more 
than his scholarship shortcoming the full-cost of attendance. Deemed an NCAA 
violation, Gurley was suspended four games. The calamity of this punishment was not 
only the suspension of profiting from his name, but that at the time of the suspension, 
Georgia was selling No. 3 jerseys on its website for $134.95.  Gurley wears that number 
on the field. Things took an even worse turn for the running back when he proceeded to 
tear his ACL in his first game back from suspension. Since 2005, schools have been 
required to certify that athletes have medical insurance coverage. The coverage does not 
have to be provided by the school, unless the athlete or the athlete’s guardian does not 
have medical coverage. In Gurley’s case, Georgia is one of the thirteen schools that use 
specialty insurance coverage for their star athletes; his policy cost $40,000 in annual 
premiums (Rovell). Thankfully, Gurley was one of the lucky athletes who was insured by 
the school’s insurance policy and was not forced to cover the cost of medical bills 
himself. 
 The cost of his suspension pales in comparison to the potential money the star 
may lose in this year’s NFL Draft. His story puts into perspective how quickly a 
collegiate star athlete can lose to the system. ESPN draft expert Mel Kiper projected 
Gurley as the eighth overall pick in this year’s NFL Draft. Last year’s eighth pick, Justin 
Gilbert, signed a four-year, $12.8 million deal that included a $7.65 million signing 
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bonus (NFL.com). Since his injury many draft experts have slotted him now as an early 
second-round pick. Last year’s first pick in the second round signed a four-year $5.5 
million contract that included a $2.3 million signing bonus. If this projection comes true, 
his knee injury will end up costing him more than $7 million. Although Gurley’s 
insurance policy does have a five million dollar loss-of-value clause if he were to go 
undrafted, but the likelihood of that happening is miniscule. With Gurley missing four 
weeks of practice time and preparation due to NCAA violations, it is feasible to believe 
that factored in to his knee injury. Gurley would have been far better off to not continue 
to participate in Division I college football after his suspension, and instead move on to 
the NFL. Although Gurley will most likely play in the NFL, his situation helps evidence 
how athletes can potentially lose out on making money of their abilities due to not being 
paid in college and then suffering a career ending injury. This speaks volumes on how the 
NCAA can have ultimate control on an athlete’s well being. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE O’BANNON CASE 
 Ed O’Bannon was a star player on the UCLA men’s basketball team. The Bruins 
won the 1995 National Championship with O’Bannon taking home the Final Four MVP 
trophy. In 2009 he was visiting a friend’s house and saw one of the children playing a 
licensed NCAA Basketball video game. The game, which was released almost 14 years 
after O’Bannon’s last collegiate basketball game, included a player who looked almost 
identical to him playing for the 1985 UCLA basketball team. Startled, O’Bannon realized 
that the NCAA and EA Sports were still profiting on his likeness even years after his 
playing career was over. The NCAA explicitly disallows players to receive benefits from 
their names, likeness, and image. They in turn, though, have no problem profiting from 
licensing agreements for the use of a player’s likeness.  
 O’Bannon took his case to court in July of 2009 filing an anti-trust class action 
lawsuit against the NCAA. The case stated that for years the NCAA has been using the 
names, likeness, and image of student-athletes while at the same time preventing them 
from profiting from those same things. The overall goal was to change an outdated 
system that relies on the use of words like “amateurism” to prevent athletes from having 
a stake in the billion-dollar industry of NCAA sports.  For O’Bannon, the case was about 
shining a light on the archaic system:  
My biggest thing has been change. These rules have been in place for a hundred 
years and there has been no change. Times have changed, the economy has 
	   29	  
changed, the players themselves have changed, the salaries of the coaches have 
changed. Everything has changed except for how a player is compensated. And 
whether [they're paid] while they're in school, or whether it's once their eligibility 
is up, that part of the game has to change. 
On August 8, 2014, the case finally received a verdict. U.S. District Judge Claudia 
Wilken issued a ninety-nine page “Findings of Fact” siding with O’Bannon. The report 
stated, “The NCAA asserts that the challenged restrictions on student-athlete 
compensation are reasonable because they are necessary to preserve its tradition of 
amateurism, maintain competitive balance among FBS football and Division I basketball 
teams, promote the integration of academics and athletics, and increase the total output of 
its product.” Amateurism has been the NCAA’s main defense in lawsuits due to the fact 
that the association believes it is core to fundamentals of collegiate athletics. Wilken 
proposed this to be false and cited: “The Court finds that the NCAA’s current restrictions 
on student-athlete compensation, which cap athletics-based financial aid below the cost 
of attendance, are not justified by the definition of amateurism set forth in its current 
bylaws.” Amateurism was deemed dead that day and change has now been set forth. 
 In accordance with the ruling, the NCAA will no longer be allowed to cap the 
amount of a full scholarship below the cost of attendance, and also cannot prevent 
schools from creating trust funds to pay men’s football and basketball players equal 
shares for the use of their name, likeness, and image (Solomon). Wilken specified that the 
optional trust funds must pay players a minimum of $5,000 each year and that the 
amounts cannot be fixed a set price, promoting competition between schools. Using this 
number, the aggregate cost over four years would be about $300 million (Farrey), if all 
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NCAA Division I men’s basketball and football programs participated. The case argued 
that with schools continuing to expand stadiums and athletic facilities, as well as 
coaching salaries constantly growing, money can be set aside to focus on giving players 
their fair share. While the O’Bannon case was a win for men’s basketball and football 
players, it is only the tip of the iceberg towards overall NCAA reform. 
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CHAPTER 6: THE FINANCIAL IMPACT OF PAYING ATHLETES 
The problem within financial reporting 
 According to the Knight Commission of Intercollegiate Athletics, college athletic 
departments are required to submit financial reports to the NCAA subject to agreed-upon 
procedures conducted by a "qualified independent accountant who is not a staff member 
of the institution" and to the U.S. Department of Education in compliance with the Equity 
in Athletics Disclosure Act (EADA) of 1994. The NCAA report is not currently publicly 
available, but donors, students, and others interested in an athletic department’s financial 
situation can access the EADA report. The problem with athletic department reporting 
starts with transparency. 
The Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board (FASAB) controls Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) as a means of standardizing financial reporting. 
The AICPA, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, hierarchy of generally 
accepted accounting principles governs what constitutes GAAP for federal reporting 
entities and lists the priority sequence of pronouncements that a federal reporting entity 
should look to for accounting and financial reporting authoritative guidance. According 
to SAS No. 69, the goal of GAAP financial reporting is to fairly present financial 
information (AICPA). 
Wolk, Dodd, and Rozycki (2013) state the conceptual framework of accounting is 
“supposed to embody a coherent system of interrelated objectives and fundamentals that 
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can lead to consistent standards and that prescribes the nature, function, and limits of 
financial accounting and financial statements.”  The qualitative characteristics of useful 
financial information are relevance and faithful representation. For information to be 
relevant, it must have predicative and confirmatory value. Predicative value relates to the 
ability of anticipating future outcomes and confirmatory value gives users the ability to 
check those earlier predictions. Information that is faithfully represented must be 
complete, fully disclose all necessary information, neutral, or free from bias, and free 
from error with no omissions and inaccuracies (Wolk, Dodd, and Rozycki 2013). The 
enhancing qualities of the characteristics are comparability, verifiability, timeliness, and 
understandability. 
 In his study on “Financial Reporting in Division I College Athletics,” Anish 
Sharma looked at NCAA and EADA reporting to determine comparability, consistency, 
and completeness of the reports. He found that the EADA report was not comparable and 
complete. The NCAA reports were not comparable, consistent, or complete. Both the 
NCAA and EADA reports were also deemed in violation of the conceptual framework of 
GAAP. This means that both NCAA and EADA reports are basically up to the discretion 
of the preparer, with no governing body like the FASB imposing stricter regulation. The 
reporting standards must be changed so that players, donors, and the general public can 
better understand the actual flow of financial resources through an athletic department. 
 
The numbers are not completely accurate 
 Division I athletic programs are constantly in an arms race to outpace the 
competition. With millions of dollars in expenses each year on salaries, remodels, and 
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scholarships, schools can have a tough time covering all these costs. In the mind of 
athletic programs, winning and recruiting top athletes to elite programs drive up these 
expenses more and more each year. Schools are constantly looking for an advantage in 
recruiting and landing top high school players. Landing these athletes means winning. 
Winning means more revenue to cover the cost of “recruiting advantages.” According to 
the NCAA, only 20 Division I schools turned a profit in 2014. While this shows a 
troubling side of collegiate athletics, it’s not the complete picture. 
 The lack of relevance and faithful representation within financial statements, as 
mentioned previously, has caused athletic departments to look as if they are only scraping 
by to continually exist. This problem originates from many schools inflating transfer-
price accounting numbers. For this argument, the athletic department can be viewed as a 
subsidiary of the actual university. Athletic departments use transfer pricing as a way to 
account for expenses sent back to university. The use of this technique causes large 
amounts of athletic profits to be moved away from the department and into the general 
resources of the university. This is evidenced by Ohio State University charging its 
athletic department $8.5 million for "overhead," "physical plant assessment," "cost 
containment" and "university fundraising," $1 million for "library renovations,” and 
another $15.7 million for scholarships (Dosh). Universities also record sending money to 
the athletic department, although those figures are not always accurately represented. 
Most schools record the money they send to their athletic departments in some 
form of a direct institutional support account. The schools though also in turn charge the 
athletic departments for the cost of providing an athletic scholarship (Goff). For instance, 
suppose a school states that they provide $20,000 of direct institutional support per 
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athlete, and also that an athletic scholarship is valued at $30,000 by the school. The 
athletic department must then account for all the scholarships they give out at that price 
and in turn deduct it as an expense charged to them by the university. The net payment 
though is only $10,000, which means that the school is actually providing no support to 
the athletic department at all. This is where the “actual” expense numbers sometimes get 
mixed up. In an article detailing how college sports programs are playing poor, Andy 
Schwarz of VICE Sports writes:  
In universities and other non-profits, transfer-price accounting is used as a way to 
manage dozens of autonomous, generally money-losing departments. For 
instance, a school's communications department is given a certain amount of 
money to spend, and free reign as to how to spend it. When it wants to use 
university services--like a secretary, a scholarship, or a classroom--it gets told a 
price, and it deducts that amount from its budget. That price might reflect the 
actual cost to the university, but it doesn't have to. It's simply a number assigned 
by a bureaucrat to manage the department's spending, so if the school wants more 
communications classes, it might lower the cost (that is, the transfer price) of 
"renting" classroom space; if it wants less spending on administrative staff, it 
might raise the listed cost of a secretarial position regardless of the actual salary 
associated with that position. This is true whether the department is called 
"Communications" or "Athletics." If central school accounting says each full 
scholarship costs $50,000, then to the department head or Athletics Director 
(AD), it likely feels like a real cost. But to the school as a whole, unless forgoing 
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that scholarship really increases total cash by $50,000, that's not what it actually 
costs. 
Transfer pricing offers an easy way for athletic departments to manage spending budgets, 
sometimes without using actual real numbers. Not only do departments benefit by doing 
this, but when actual surpluses arise many schools dump that money back into expenses 
such as renovations, raising coaching salaries, or building new facilities. Due to the 
potential idea of having to pay collegiate athletes, it makes sense for schools to try and 
hide those surpluses.  
 Dr. Brian Goff of the University of Western Kentucky’s Department of 
Economics published a paper in 2000 on the quantifiable effects of intercollegiate 
athletics. The paper focused on empirical data in regards to the financial reporting of the 
109 NCAA Division I schools at the time. Goff deemed several adjustments necessary to 
accurately assess a school’s financial situation. The first adjustment was valuing grant-in-
aid expenses at their true incremental expense to the university instead of at fictitious 
“list” prices. Secondly, Goff adjusted athletics-produced revenues that were attributed to 
non-athletic accountants. He did this because at most universities some, if not all, 
merchandising sales, concession revenues, parking receipts, and other related revenues 
are attributed to a university’s general fund and non-athletic accounts. This causes 
athletic department revenue to be undervalued. The results, after accounting for 
adjustments, showed that only 10% of Division I schools lost money that year. Of those 
eleven schools all but three came from the Mid-American Conference, whose universities 
continually rank in the lowest level of Division I men’s football and basketball programs. 
The results also found that 79% of departments exceeded $1 million in annual profits, 
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with 72% exceeding $2 million. Although this study was done ten years ago, those 
numbers have likely grown due to the growth of college athletics and more schools 
entering Division I. To better account for the inflows and outflows of resources, schools 
should be forced to reconcile their financial statements based upon actual yearly 
transactions. Through reconciliation, a school’s athletic department would no longer be 
able to hide surpluses and create expenses that make it seem as if they are struggling to 
make ends meet. Accounting policy reform needs to be mandated to show the public the 
actual financial reality of collegiate athletic departments. Without this reform, schools 
will continue to abuse the system. 
 
Value of Athletes 
Schools use a player’s image for just about anything. Whether it is through 
filming advertisements, attending fundraisers, or promoting interviews, athletes can offer 
a tremendous public relation’s boost. Many athletes also play an important role in 
recruiting others to play at their respective universities. Apart from being students and 
playing sports, athletes are some of the best ambassadors for a school. Star players can 
have an impact that far outreaches the scoreboard.  
 Along with generating large sums of money, athletes bring tremendous exposure 
to a university. Florida Gulf Coast University was the Cinderella story of the men’s 
NCAA Basketball Tournament last year. The school became the first ever fifteenth seed 
to make it to the Sweet 16, and was known as “Dunk City” for their high flying abilities. 
After the tournament, FGCU experienced a 35.4 % year-after-year spike in freshman 
applications. In addition to bringing in millions for the school by making the tournament 
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and winning two games, the basketball team’s athletes helped put the small school on the 
map for high school students. The same is true for smaller schools that had similar 
tournament success. According to Eamonn Brennan of ESPN, the admission spike of 
Florida Gulf Coast was not the first time basketball made a smaller school’s relevance 
increase: 
The correlation would be too strong in the absence of previous basketball-related 
exposure evidence, but there is plenty of precedent there, too. In 2006, a George 
Mason professor published a study claiming the Final Four-qualifying Patriots 
had received roughly $677 million in free advertising; its enrollment spiked by 
350 percent. In 2010, after Butler’s inches-away loss to Duke in the national title 
game, the university estimated it received about $410 million in free exposure. It 
received a 41 percent increase in admissions applications. 
Athletics bring out school spirit more than any other department. The sense of connection 
alumni have with their school’s teams is why college sports are revered as being more 
passionate than their professional counterparts. 
 A university’s alumni will undoubtedly always support, both financially and 
emotionally, the athletic program. Boosters will always be there to donate money to the 
athletic program, but the ultimate financial success of a program relies heavily on the 
athletes. The 2011-2012 Ole Miss Football Team won two games. The attendance at 
games became abysmal. The following season football team won seven games and their 
first bowl game since 2009. According to the university’s EADA Reports, athletic 
contributions rose from $10,933,092 in 2012 to $18,454,960 in 2013. This 68.8% 
increase came primarily due to the athletes on the football team winning games. In 
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February of 2013, the football team signed the number five recruiting class in the nation. 
This lead to the school selling a record 50,386 season tickets for the upcoming football 
season (Ole Miss Sports). There is a direct correlation between the high profile players 
signed that year and the number of season tickets sold. This helps evidence how an 
athlete’s ability to help a team win games leads to financial success for the athletic 
department. Although the alumni and boosters at Ole Miss will consistently give money 
to the athletic department regardless of the players on the team, the specific amount of 
money can be directly attributed to how well athletes on each team perform. The 
achievements on the field by athletes are the driving factor behind how much money an 
athletic department can potentially raise. 
 If players were allowed to be bought and sold on the open market, their estimated 
values are remarkable. In a study done by Drexel University and the National College 
Players Association, the projected fair market value of the average college football player 
was $178,000 per year from 2011 to 2015, while the projected market value of an 
average college basketball player over the same time period was $375,000 (Kona). The 
same study estimated that exceptionally talented athletes, like Johnny Manziel and 
Andrew Wiggins, could have been worth as much as $547,000 and $1.2 million per year 
during their college careers. Although it would not be feasible to pay these players using 
those same figures, their market prices do attest to the overall value they provide to the 
NCAA and its universities.  
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How much will it cost?  
 Due to the NCAA’s amateur laws, athletes have been disallowed from receiving 
their portion of the proverbial pie in college athletics. The NCAA has become the best 
free farm system in the world for professional sports by forcing all athletes except 
baseball, tennis, and golf players to attend college before turning pro. Theoretically the 
association is telling players that in order to achieve your dreams of playing 
professionally, you first have to play for our schools and abide by our four-hundred-page 
manual that prevents you from receiving any compensation. While players indeed 
deserve some form of monetary compensation, the financial impact of paying all athletes 
could be extremely costly. 
 The University of Mississippi Athletic Department recorded in its 2014 NCAA 
Report that revenues exceeded expenses by $2,555,504. The University reported that 321 
student-athletes received athletic aid during the past year. With the surplus sitting at just 
over two and a half million dollars, the school would be able to pay every student athlete 
the minimum amount of money required by the O’Bannon ruling. By being a member of 
the Southeastern Conference, Ole Miss has the financial backing of the wealthiest league 
within intercollegiate athletics. For schools outside of the SEC and the other large 
conferences, the costs of paying players could severely outweigh the revenues brought in 
by the conference and its teams. What may in fact be manageable for a school like Ole 
Miss could be insurmountable for smaller schools with below average revenues. 
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Table 6-1: The Financial Impact on Ole Miss and the NCAA  
 
Sources: Ole Miss NCAA Report (2014) and NCAA 
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For the NCAA to pay every Division I student-athlete based on the number of 
scholarships, the cost would be north of $400 million (Table 6-1). The cost to pay all 
Division I football players alone would be over $50 million (Table 6-1). To reach $400 
million would require all of the 351 Division I schools to increase yearly revenues or 
decrease yearly expenses by an average of $1.1 million. After adding in all Division II 
scholarship athletes the cost quickly jumps up to almost $600 million (Table 6-1). This 
daunting figure brings into question whether or not every athlete deserves to be paid, and 
how to determine which sport’s athletes should be paid. There would have to be major 
sacrifices made by each school, through cutting costs or even programs, just to have a 
shot at coming close to that number. The truth is that not all schools have the 
pocketbooks to pay every athlete, thereby forcing the NCAA or a third-party to cover the 
remaining costs.  
Compensating players could potentially be followed by income taxation 
repercussions. If universities and the NCAA were to start treating student-athletes as 
employees, they would possibly be in jeopardy of losing their non-profit status. The cost 
of having to pay these taxes could be detrimental to some schools’ ability to pay their 
athletes.  
 In addition to the compensation, the financial impact of allowing players to make 
money on their names, likeness, and image could extend beyond the NCAA and into the 
pockets of third parties. For example, this rule would allow Ole Miss star football players 
Laquon Treadwell and Robert Nkemdiche to sign endorsement deals and autographs for 
money if they so chose. If sponsors are willing to endorse athletes, then the money 
athletes could generate for themselves would extend far beyond the $5,000 annual 
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allowance. This court-ordered NLI change could have a financial impact that affects not 
only the NCAA, but also some of its largest sponsors and corporate partners.  
 
Power Five Conferences 
 According to USA Today, 44 of the top 50 highest revenue generating athletic 
departments reported that their revenues exceeded expenses. All of those 44 schools 
came from a Power Five conference. This helps show how the schools generating the 
most money, are also the schools that have the ability to pay athletes. For those schools 
that value their athletic departments, like the members of the Power Five Conferences, 
the financial means to pay athletes are available through the money generated by having a 
successful athletic program. The number of National Championships that the members of 
the Power Five Conferences have won evidences this dominance. The 1990 UNLV 
Rebels were the last non-Power Five program to win the NCAA March Madness 
Tournament. Also, no small conference team has won the FBS National Championship 
since BYU in 1984. As the landscape of collegiate athletics has changed, the larger 
conferences have continued to become wealthier. The schools within these five 
conferences attract the nation’s top high school talent and often have the best teams. 
Winning means more money for the conference, as well as the potential ability to pay 
student-athletes. 
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Table 6-3: The Financial Impact on All Power Five Schools 
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Sources: USA TODAY and EADA Reports (2014) 
  
The Power Five conferences had forty-seven (72%) athletic departments report a 
surplus in 2014 (Table 6-3). Twenty-one of those schools surpluses exceeded five million 
dollars, with Alabama having the largest surplus at over $27 million. Only seven (11%) 
athletic departments reported a deficit, and eleven (17%) stated that they came out even 
during the year (Table 6-3). The SEC lead the field with all but Vanderbilt, whom 
reported breaking even, having athletic revenues that exceed athletic expenses. The Pac-
12 was at the bottom of the list with only seven of its twelve members recording a 
surplus. Each schools total number of athletic scholarships were multiplied by the $5,000 
minimum compensation limit, per the O’Bannon case ruling, in order to determine which 
schools could afford the cost of paying their scholarship athletes. The results showed that 
after compensating all scholarship athletes, thirty-five (54%) athletic departments would 
still have a surplus in 2014 (Table 6-3).  The financial impact of paying athletes would 
cause twelve Power Five schools to change from reporting a surplus to reporting a deficit. 
Although not all members could afford paying their players, each conference has the 
financial means to make it happen. The Power Five conferences as whole would still 
retain an $81 million surplus after paying the athletes (Table 6-3).  
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 Competitive balance could become an issue if all Power Five conferences started 
paying their collegiate athletes. The gap between these five conferences and the rest of 
the NCAA Division I conferences is apparent by the championship dominance of the 
Power Five. New issues could arise within these five conferences though if athletes were 
to start being paid. The conferences would be forced to deal with the question of whether 
or not the schools that still retain a surplus after paying their athletes should have to help 
the remaining members of the conference that cannot afford to do the same. The risk of 
imbalance within conferences could cause inter-school competiveness to dramatically 
decline. The Power Five conferences already draw in top high school recruits each year, 
but schools within these conferences that do not have the ability to pay student-athletes 
could potentially lose recruits to the members of the conference that can afford to pay. 
This potential disparity could cause athletic departments to cut out certain sports in order 
to remain competitive.    
The future outlook of the Power Five conferences still remains bright. Each 
conference has an exclusive long-term television contract with either ESPN, CBS, FOX, 
NBC, or their own conference network. Winning has brought the Power Five tremendous 
financial success, and it’s in large part due to the skill that the athletes in these 
conferences possess. Alumni will watch their school’s games regardless of the athletes on 
the team, but those same athletes are primarily responsible for bringing in the national 
appeal and viewership of an LSU versus Alabama type football game. Paying all athletes 
within these conferences could be challenging, but in comparison to the cost of paying all 
of the Division I athletes, it is a relatively good place to start.  
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Title IX 
 In 1972, Title IX of the Education Amendments was signed into law. The U.S. 
Justice Department states, “Title IX is a comprehensive federal law that prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of sex in any federally funded education program or activity. 
The principal objective of Title IX is to avoid the use of federal money to support sex 
discrimination in education programs and to provide individual citizens effective 
protection against those practices.” The goal of Title IX was to end discrimination based 
on gender across an array of educational activities, including collegiate athletics. In 
1971–1972, there were fewer than 30,000 women participating in collegiate athletics, but 
in 2010–2011 the number of women playing sports in college exceeded 190,000 
(NCWGE). In 1972, women’s sports received on average two percent of a school’s 
athletic budget and, moreover, were not rewarded any athletic scholarships. Thanks to 
Title IX, women received 48% of the total athletic scholarship dollars at Division I 
schools in 2009-2010 (NCWGE). The improvement Title IX has made to women’s sports 
is undeniable. When it comes to potentially paying athletes, the equality of genders must 
remain intact for the model to be free from appeal. 
 This can be a difficult task for the NCAA due to the monetary differences seen 
between men and women’s professional sports. Professional basketball salaries offer a 
lateral comparison. The average NBA player’s salary during the 2013-2014 season was 
$4.9 million (Badenhausen). To put that number in perspective the WNBA’s maximum 
salary was $107,000 or approximately 4500% less than the NBA’s average salary 
(Fagan). Sadly, there is just not enough money professionally in women’s sports for them 
to pay equally. The NCAA is not allowed to play by those same rules. For most schools, 
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their highest revenue generating women’s sport is basketball. Although women’s 
basketball teams generate revenue, only 43 of the 341 Division I programs turned a profit 
in 2011 (Smith). This has forced men’s athletic profits to cover the losses by women’s 
sports.  
 Title IX forces schools to make available equal participation among men and 
women in sports. The law also requires schools to spend financial assistance 
proportionally to participation rates. According to the Women’s Sports Foundation, an 
estimated 80 to 90 percent of all higher education institutions are not in compliance with 
Title IX. In the eyes of athletic directors, cutting costs from a non revenue generating 
women’s sport is far more reasonable then cutting back on projects benefitting the 
football team. In order to avoid lawsuits though, the NCAA reform will have to pay 
female athletes their equal share of the pot. Even with athletic departments generating the 
vast majority of their revenues from men’s football and basketball, women’s teams have 
a valid stake to claim as well. There is no doubt that women athletes compete and 
practice just as hard as men, and also have to balance the long hours of both athletics and 
academics.  
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
 The landscape of the NCAA has changed drastically since its founding in 1906. 
Collegiate athletics have grown into a multibillion-dollar industry with everyone reaping 
the financial benefits except for the athletes who play in the games. The NCAA has long 
abided by insisting that student-athletes are amateurs. The principal of amateurism in the 
association’s bylaws state that “student participation in intercollegiate athletics is an 
avocation, and student-athletes should be protected from exploitation by professional and 
commercial enterprises.” This statement comes from the same association that allows 
corporate sponsors for every athletic event, as well as television networks to pay billions 
for the rights to broadcast collegiate games. College athletes are some of the most 
commercially exploited people in our entire country, as evidenced by the amount of 
money made off of them each year. The code of amateurism is outdated. The time when 
players were just recreationally playing sports for colleges has long since passed. Reality 
has begun to set in; today’s athletes have become the foundation for one of the largest 
open markets in our country. 
This never-ending circle of injustice needs and deserves to be brought to an end. 
If the NCAA is going to stand by and defend the amateur status of collegiate athletes, 
then they should actually adopt an amateur model. Do away with television contracts, 
coaching salaries, athletic scholarships, sponsorships and, so forth, in order for the 
NCAA to candidly deem paying athletes as “antithetical to the whole principle of 
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intercollegiate athletics”. Let all students try out for teams coached by professors who 
compete out of nothing more than for the love of the game.  
 Growth is a word that defines collegiate athletics. From revenues and coaching 
salaries, to stadium expansions and sponsorship deals, everyone except the athlete has 
benefitted financially. This growth is visible to the naked eye, but it is not always 
detectible through the lens of the financial statements. The conundrum is that if the 
NCAA and its universities began showing profits generated by collegiate athletics, it 
could mean another 460,000 hands reaching out to claim a share. It brings into question 
how an entity that operated with an eighty million dollar surplus in 2014 was able to 
prevent their most important “employees” from receiving any compensation. Most 
athletic departments, due to the flawed accounting methods they use, hide this same 
problem. Reconciliation needs to occur in order to match what the naked eye is seeing 
with what the actual financial reports are showing.  
The truth is that college athletes don’t need to be paid large sums of money, but 
for all athletes to receive absolutely zero money is unreasonable. The NCAA has 
theoretically turned Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs on its head. With the NCAA Manual 
deeming that receiving food and financial assistance from a third party a violation, 
athletes can be forced to sacrifice their basic physical needs in life. The NCAA, first and 
foremost though, requires athletes to abide by the association’s definition of morality and 
lack of prejudice. The verdicts of several class-action anti-trust lawsuits have recognized 
that the NCAA is fundamentally flawed. In order to right the wrong of exploiting 
athletes, change must occur. The solution is for the NCAA to release its all-encompassing 
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control over a student-athlete, and finally begin to treat players with the respect and 
financial benefits that they undoubtedly deserve. 
 Paying every single Division I scholarship athlete is economically unreasonable. 
The financial impact of paying all these athletes is over $400 million. There is no viable 
solution for this problem without a total renovation of how NCAA revenues are 
distributed to schools. Instead, paying players within the Power Five Conferences offer a 
good base solution to the problem. The cost of paying the athletes within these 
conferences is $87.6 million, which is a much more attainable goal. Both the SEC and 
Big Ten have their own television network, and all schools within the five major 
conferences generate over forty-six million in revenues annually. Naturally, the success 
these schools have had on the field has, in turn, made them the wealthiest in the entire 
NCAA. The Power Five Conferences have fourteen schools that generate over $100 
million each year. Based on this information, it is reasonable to believe that those schools 
could potentially set aside roughly two percent of their athletic revenues per year for the 
specific use of paying athletes. As of 2014, thirty-five of the sixty-five Power Five 
schools would be able to financially self-support paying their scholarship athletes $5,000 
annually. There are though potential difficulties with paying Power Five athletes, due to 
some of the athletic departments operating at a deficit, but with the total combined 
athletic surplus of the conferences these difficulties can be overcome. There is no perfect 
solution to solving the issue of athletes receiving zero monetary compensation, but 
paying athletes in the Power Five Conferences offers the most reasonable platform for the 
NCAA to use in order to partially fix the problem. 
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